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An increasingly popular justification for conscription is that by changing the identities of those 
who bear the burden of fighting a nation’s wars, it limits, more than an all-volunteer force would, 
support for war.  Under a draft, goes the argument, there is a higher probability that the 
“children” of more-affluent and politically powerful people could serve in the military, thus 
giving them an incentive to lobby against war.  However, this argument neglects the fact that 
successfully avoiding war for a nation is a public good and is, therefore, subject to the classic 
free-rider problem.  We develop a simple model to demonstrate that the under-provision of anti-
war agitation from those seeking to avoid the draft is exacerbated by the fact that seeking a 
deferment provides an alternative with a superior private payoff.  Resources that an affluent or 
politically powerful person devotes to preventing or stopping a war will not likely have a 
noticeable effect on the overall outcome.  In contrast, resources spent to secure a deferment or 
non-combat assignment for a loved one have a tangible effect on a private good.  We show that 
the effectiveness of using conscription as a means of diminishing political support for war 
relative to an all-volunteer force is limited.  Empirical findings from the Vietnam War era and 
more recent history are consistent with our thesis. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
 
An increasingly popular justification for conscription is that by changing the identities of those 
who bear the burden of fighting a nation’s wars, it limits, more than an all-volunteer force would, 
support for war.  Under a draft, goes the argument, there is a higher probability that the 
“children” of more-affluent and politically powerful people could be drafted.  This higher 
probability focuses the attention of at least some of the affluent and politically powerful, giving 
them an incentive to lobby and agitate against war.   
 
The first step of the argument is that with a draft, more of the children of the more-affluent 
and/or more-politically powerful families would be at risk of being in the military. Step two is 
that many of them would be drafted and, if drafted, would be sent to fight the war.  Step three is 
that the parents would be motivated to lobby or agitate against the war.  However, steps two and 
three are either outright false or too weak to matter.   
 
Our argument is as follows.  Successfully avoiding war for a country, as opposed to successfully 
avoiding one’s own participation in war, is a public good1.  Those who benefit from avoiding a 
war do so whether or not they or their parents spent time or money in trying to prevent the war.  
War prevention, therefore, is a public good and, as such, is subject to the classic free-rider 
problem.  The under-provision of anti-war agitation from those seeking to avoid the draft is 
exacerbated by the fact that seeking a deferment provides an alternative with a superior private 
                                                            
1 Of course, some could argue that a justified war is a public good so that successfully avoiding war is a “public 
bad.”  The context of this paper, though, is a debate in which both proponents of conscription and opponents of 




payoff.  Affluent or politically powerful parents deciding how many resources to devote to 
preventing or stopping a war so that their children will avoid being put at risk will realize that 
their individual resources will not be enough to have a noticeable effect on whether there is a 
war.  The issue is too large and a given non-billionaire’s resources are too small.  Parents can, 
however, by spending resources, have a tangible effect on a private good: that of helping their 
children (most likely, sons2) avoid the draft or, if their children have already been drafted, 
helping their children avoid being sent into the war theatre.  The effectiveness, therefore, of 
using conscription as a means of diminishing political support for war is much smaller than 
many people think.   
 
 
II.  The Setting 
 
 
On five separate occasions between 2003 and 2010, Democratic Representative Charles Rangel 
of New York introduced legislation to reinstate conscription to ensure “a more equitable 
representation of people making sacrifices.”  In 2006 he was quoted as saying "There's no 
question in my mind that this president and this administration would never have invaded Iraq … 
if indeed we had a draft and members of Congress and the administration thought that their kids 
from their communities would be placed in harm's way (Heilprin, 2006).” More recently, U.S. 
Army Lieutenant Colonel Paul L. Yingling, writing in Armed Forces Journal, called for a 
reinstatement of the draft in order to enforce equity and limit support for war.  In similar fashion, 
journalist Bill Moyers (2009) advocates bringing back the draft.  The common theme permeating 
                                                            
2 We assume that the people who would actually be drafted are male.  The reason for this is not just the historical 
fact that every draft in U.S. history has been exclusively of males, but also the fact that current draft registration in 
the United States is aimed solely at males.  However, nothing in our analysis is changed if females are also subject 




these calls is the supposition that a return to conscription would reduce support for the wars in 
which the U.S. military is currently engaged.  In this paper, we leave aside any discussion of the 
morality of conscription and concentrate entirely on the proposition that a policy of conscription 
more effectively reduces support for foreign wars than does enlisting volunteers.   
 
III.  Literature Review  
 
 
Wagner (1972) examines, through the lens of democratic politics, the effect of enlistment 
method on military budgets and the collective decision to go to war.  He concludes that having 
an all-volunteer military makes the government less likely to go to war than if some of the 
military were drafted.  His reasoning is that having an all-volunteer force makes the cost of the 
force and of war more visible.  A draft, by contrast, hides part of the cost of war by taking some 
of it out of the explicit defense budget and putting it on the backs of young men.  The median 
voter is not likely to be a young draftee.  Instead, the median voter will be a taxpayer.3  Because 
the military must persuade, rather than coerce, people to join an all-volunteer military, it will 
likely pay higher wages in the event of a war.  This raises the cost to the median voter, making a 
given war less likely to occur.   
 
Horowitz and Levendusky (2011) report the results of a hypothetical question to examine the 
link between conscription and support for war.  Using a survey experiment, they test the 
hypothesis that a return to conscription will increase support for a future war in which the U.S. 
government might become engaged.  Their evidence suggests that a return to conscription would 
                                                            
3 Of course, the draftee is a taxpayer who is particularly heavily taxed in kind, as was noted by many economists 
who studied the draft during the 1960s and 1970s.  See Oi (1967a, 1967b), Sjaastad and Hansen (1970), and Cooper 
(1975, 1977).  We are using the term “taxpayer” in the more-commonly used sense to mean someone who 




reduce support for war, particularly among draft-aged men.  More reasoning and detail are 
needed, though, if one wants to make the case that support or opposition to a war by a large 
percent of the public has an effect on whether wars are fought.  Public opinion polls beginning in 
2005 showed that support for the war in Iraq had diminished and yet troops did not leave Iraq 
until December 2011.  This suggests that public opposition per se is not enough to cause the U.S. 
government to end wars.  Horowitz and Levendusky (2011) would be more compelling if the 
U.S. government were to decide to go to war by referendum rather than, ever since World War 
II, by presidential decision with only a zero-to-medium Congressional input4.  To some extent, 
even to economists steeped in public choice, the workings of a democratic government are like a 
black box whose inner mechanisms we understand only imperfectly.   
 
Warren (2011) develops a model in which people get subjective private benefits from war and 
bear costs of serving in the form of forgone private opportunities5.  He finds that the all-
volunteer force results in greater support for war where “the war is small, there are few 
lukewarm civilian supporters, there are many lukewarm military supporters, and there are many 
people who have large costs for fighting and moderate benefits from war (pg. 24).”  The 
following paragraphs give the intuition for his result.  
 
Citizens obtain private expected benefits if the country goes to war.  Each pays a private cost if 
he or she personally fights in the war.  In most cases, citizens’ military status is decided and then 
                                                            
4 Consider a non-exhaustive list since World War II.  In 2003, President George W. Bush did get from Congress an 
authorization to use military force in Iraq.  But Congress was not consulted on the Korean War in the early 1950s 
and was consulted very little about the Vietnam war.  There was no Congressional consultation for the recent U.S 
war on the Libyan government. 
5 These private benefits can include military pay, a chance to act on one’s patriotic impulses, respect from one’s 




support for the war is measured.  This support is net of any wages from military service received, 
lump sum taxes paid, and any payment paid or received for or as a draft proxy.  On the basis of 
the interaction between individual preferences and manpower procurement systems, the author 
deduces conclusions regarding which systems result in greater or less support for wars (Warren 
2011, pg 4-5). 
 
Warren considers an all volunteer military; a simple draft where all military personnel are 
draftees; an optimal draft where those initially drafted could pay for a proxy to fight in his stead; 
and a partial draft where a portion of the military volunteers at a particular wage and additional 
military members are conscripted.  The only unambiguous conclusion is that the simple draft is 
never support maximizing, because both the optimal and partial drafts allocate military 
manpower more efficiently by increasing the proportion of those who serve willingly (pg. 21).  
All other comparisons depend entirely on the distribution of individual costs and benefits.  For 
example, in comparing the volunteer military and the partial draft, Warren finds that the 
volunteer military is likely support maximizing when many soldiers are lukewarm supporters 
because “a cut in their pay turns them against the war (pg 21).”  If there is a large proportion of 
civilians who expect to obtain large benefits from the war, but do not wish to fight, these 
individuals are willing to bear the tax burden to pay volunteers as opposed to bear the risk of 
being drafted under a regime of conscription.  In addition, the presence of a large proportion of 
civilians with large expected benefits from the war means that fewer citizens are likely to support 




introduction of conscription would switch relatively fewer of them from non-supportive of war 
to supportive6.   
 
Warren’s model is sound logically, as far as it goes.  In addition, the assumption that draftees 
under a simple draft are paid a zero wage thereby generating zero tax burden for other taxpayers, 
and the fact that citizens decide after the draft results whether to support the given war, probably 
mean that his model overstates support for war under the draft in some cases.  His work 
highlights the fact that the question of which military manpower procurement regime results in 
most support for wars is ultimately an empirical one.   
 
However, his model omits two important phenomena that are crucial to the current analysis.  The 
first is the political process through which society decides to engage in war and then pay for it 
via taxation.  Warren basically compares totals of supporters and opponents of the war in 
question but does not consider how politicians actually decide whether to go to war.  Second, his 
assumption of efficient lump-sum taxation ignores the critical fact that the federal tax structure is 
highly progressive.  Advocates of recent calls for reinstitution of the draft claim that the affluent 
and politically powerful are particularly immune to the burdens of the all-volunteer military.  In 
contrast, we argue that fighting a war with an all-volunteer force places a substantial fiscal 
burden on them. 
 
Third, Warren abstracts from the political economy of actually carrying out a draft.  Though he 
does consider various forms of the draft, including a selective service regime, in his model all 
draftees are randomly selected and inducted into the military without exception.  In reality and at 
                                                            




the very least, not everyone meets the set of objective standards for induction into the military, 
such as age, physical fitness, medical condition, etc.  In addition, many factors come down to 
subjective judgment on the part of officials implementing the draft policy.  Such factors include 
certain medical conditions, mental conditions, and job and family status, as well as a number of 
other avenues for deferments.  As we discuss below, history teaches us that some individuals 
were more adept than others at avoiding the draft and obtaining favorable outcomes (deferments) 
from the draft board.  Even if a more egalitarian policy than existed in the past were 
implemented, we argue that because all policy must account for exceptions, the affluent and 
politically powerful will always be able to take more advantage of such exceptions than those of 
lesser means can take. 
 
A number of other studies—Perri (2008), White (1989), Ross (1994), and Berck and Lipow 
(2011)—consider various fiscal and efficiency implications of conscription; none of these 
studies, however, considers how the fiscal and efficiency factors affect support for war.  Lee and 
McKenzie (1992), Warner and Asch (2001), and Warner, Miller and Asch (2007) all consider the 
conditions under which the efficiency argument for the all-volunteer force breaks down.  For 
example, in instances where a very large mobilization of manpower is required, the military 
wage sufficiently high to attract enough volunteers might result in so high a tax burden that the 
deadweight loss from the necessary taxation exceeds the deadweight loss from conscription.  
This reasoning is sound, but it has only limited application to the current problem.  The reason is 
that we are most interested in relatively small military actions.  The tradeoff between the 
deadweight loss from conscription and the deadweight loss from higher taxation is relevant only 




and James (2003, 2008) are examples of cross-country empirical studies that examine the 
relationship between military labor regime and militancy.  The authors find that countries with 
military manpower systems with conscription are involved in more military disputes; however, it 
is unclear how much of the relationship is endogenous and how applicable it is to the United 
States.   
 
 
This paper borrows heavily from the theory of public goods (Samuelson 1954) and subsequent 
examination by other scholars about the incentives for people to enjoy public goods without 
contributing to their production.  For example, in his seminal work (Olson 1971), Olson 
demonstrates that within any group of individuals cooperating for the purpose of producing a 
public good there is a private incentive to free ride.  Because public goods are non-excludable, it 
is impossible to limit their application to those who participated in their creation.  Thus, the 
individual faces a powerful incentive to conserve his or her own resources and allow others in 
the collective to produce the public good.  Olson also demonstrates that this private incentive to 
free ride is greater for larger and more heterogeneous groups. 
     
Our research fills a crucial gap in the literature.  Only a few scholars have even compared the 
effect of conscription and volunteer militaries on support for war.  None has applied the theory 
of public goods to examine the assertion that conscription encourages people to seek a political 









IV.  Avoiding Wartime Service 
 
 
Following Wagner (1972), there are four possible combinations between public support and 
whether military forces are engaged in hostilities.  Military forces may either be at war or not, 
and public sentiment may either be growing or declining in favor of war.  For purposes of this 
analysis, we concentrate on the situations in which public sentiment is at odds with government’s 
decision on war.   
 
This focuses the discussion on either one of two scenarios.  The first is where a nation not 
currently at war is facing growing public sentiment to enter into hostilities.  A recent example of 
this in American history is the period of late 2002 and early 2003 when the public intensely 
debated the prospect of invading Iraq.  The alternative scenario is one where a nation has armed 
forces engaged in combat operations but the public has grown increasingly opposed to the 
conflict.  This is like the situation in 2008 in which support for the war in Iraq had eroded and 
Barack Obama won the presidential election on a platform of ending the war.  These are the most 
interesting scenarios for our study because they are the only likely ones in which the military 
recruitment regime might make a difference as to whether the status of military forces changes. 
 
The other possibilities are neglected in this paper.  A situation in which a nation is conducting a 
war that the public broadly supports is not likely affected by the whether the military members 
are volunteers or draftees.  Consider the American experience in World War II.  Although there 
were a few anti-war protests, most Americans thought that U.S. participation in World War II 




whether the manpower to wage the war was raised via conscription or volunteers did not likely 
have much effect on its popularity.7  The situation in which a nation is not at war and the public 
is not interested in fighting one is also not germane to this paper.  For example, while the United 
States and Canada occasionally have diplomatic conflicts, the military recruiting regime is 
certainly not the reason why the United States refrains from engaging in open hostilities.   
 
A.  Avoiding Service in a Draft Military 
 
Consider two ways for a draft-eligible man to avoid wartime service.  One is for the man and/or 
his parents to engage in “political agitation” to influence the vote of his Representative or 
Senators8.  There are various ways to agitate.  One way is to contact the politician, either with 
phone calls, e-mails, faxes, or visits to the politician’s office in Washington, D.C. or to the 
politician’s office in his Congressional district.  Another way is to buy ads in newspapers or on 
TV and radio stations calling on the politician to vote against the war.  Yet another way is to 
contribute money to the campaigns of politicians who the contributor thinks will vote the way 
the contributor wants him to.  There are a few other ways to agitate, such as working directly in 
political campaigns or political clubs.  
 
All of these ways of agitating, though, have two things in common.  First, they are attempts to 
create a public or collective good.  Second, each method uses the contributor’s resources: time 
and/or money.  This means that those who agitate will be creating benefits mainly for others.  
This combination of private costs and collective benefits leads, as is well known in the literature, 
to under-provision of the collective good. 
                                                            
7 Higgs (1992) writes, “Of the 16 million persons who served in the [U.S.] armed forces at some time during the 
war, 10 million were conscripted.” 





Recall that the argument that many people have made for conscription is that it would put people 
at risk so that they will be motivated to agitate against war.  Therefore, someone so motivated 
will do so for one main reason: so that he, personally, will not be at risk.   
 
Is there another way for the draftee or potential draftee to avoid being sent in harm’s way, a way 
that avoids the massive collective good problem that confronts the potential “agitator?”  Yes.  It 
is to seek to avoid being drafted in the first place or, if drafted, to seek a relatively safe job in the 
military, one that is nowhere near the military theater.  He can seek to avoid being drafted by 
deferring military service or by being classified as ineligible for the draft.  One way to raise his 
odds is to use, or have his parent(s) use, political influence with a draft board or a politician.  The 
big advantage of such an approach over the method of agitation is that the potential or actual 
draftee and/or his parents are creating a private good, one from which only he benefits.  Because 
of that, he and/or his parents would be more willing to invest time and money in seeking this 
particular way out.  
 
B.  A Simple Model of Behavior Under Threat of Conscription 
 
Suppose the United States government is considering going to war.  If the government decides to 
go to war, one son in each of the thousand most affluent or most politically influential families 
(among others) will be selected to be conscripted.  We make such an extreme assumption, not 
because we think it is plausible, but, rather, to make the draft proponents’ case most strongly.  A 
situation in which the thousand most affluent or politically influential families all have a son at 




opposition would have the best chance to obtain.  Note that there is a distinction between being 
selected for conscription and being conscripted.  If the U.S. government goes to war and the 
individual takes no special action, he will be drafted.  So some form of exemptions may be open 
to the individual.  Likewise, since these are the most powerful families in the country, if K of 
them use their influence to lobby against the war, then war is averted.  
 
Let c be the individual’s net cost of going to war.  (c equals total subjective costs minus 
wages/benefits received.)  If an individual, or his family, decides to agitate or lobby against the 
war, he applies resources ba  ( ba > 0 ).  Assume that these families are homogeneous and share 
identical numerical values for c and ba.  Finally, let X be the number of individuals that lobby 
against the war.  If X ≥ K, then the war is averted and no one is drafted.  Otherwise, the war 
continues.  Thus, the problem the families face is to solve the collective action problem as 
depicted in Table 1 and avoid the war so as to prevent their sons from being conscripted and sent 
to war.   
 
Figure 1.  Payoff Matrix for Simple Conscription Game 
 
 
Figure 1 describes a classic public goods or prisoner’s dilemma game.  If all others lobby against 
the war, then the individual has an incentive to free-ride and do nothing because the war is 
(Player i, All Others) Do Nothing Lobby Against War
Player i  is Drafted War is avoided
( -c , -c) ( 0 , -ba )
Player i  is Drafted War is avoided






avoided and the individual avoids the costs of lobbing, ba, and the cost of being conscripted, c. If 
all others do nothing, the war happens anyway and anything the individual contributes to the 
provision of the public good is lost.  Thus, in both cases, the individual is better off not 
contributing, and since most people anticipate this eventuality, few lobby against the war and the 
public good is not produced.  
   
Consider that in reality these families have an additional private alternative open to them, which 
is to seek a deferment.  Let Pd = Prob ( individual granted deferment | individual pursues 
deferment ) > 0.  An individual who decides to seek a deferment applies resources bd ( bd > 0 ).  
If the deferment is successful with probability Pd ,9 the payoff for an individual who seeks a 
deferment is given by10: 
-bd + Pd∙( 0 ) + ( 1- Pd )∙( –c ) = -bd – c + Pdc 
 
We model obtaining deferment as a simple gamble because seeking to obtain a deferment is a 
risky course of action that does not require the cooperation of the other players in the model.11  
Figure 2 contains the new payoff matrix.   
 
Figure 2.  Payoff Matrix for Conscription Game with Deferment 
                                                            
9 Note that, in reality, Pd may fall as more people seek deferments.  Therefore Pd in the far-right column may be 
lower than Pd in the far-left column.  This weakens our case.  However, the drop in Pd is unlikely to be of practical 
significance because in reality, the proportion of politically powerful individuals subject to the draft is small relative 
to the total at risk of being drafted.  In other words, in practice, the draft system will likely be able to accommodate a 
large number of deferments while still raising a sufficient number of conscriptees. . 
10We simplify by considering only deferments whereby the individual avoids military service entirely, rather than 
non-combat assignments within the military. 






As before, do nothing strictly dominates lobby against war.  However, when ba > bd , seek 
deferment also strictly dominates lobby against war.  That is, when the individual’s required 
contribution to the lobbying effort exceeds that required for deferment, individuals will tend to 
prefer to seek deferment rather than agitate against the war.  Considering the resources the 
collective must marshal in order to affect change in the political process, it is easy to conceive of 
reasonable situations that fit this criterion.   
  
It is also the case that as the cost of being conscripted, c, and the probability of successfully 
obtaining deferment, Pd , increase, so too does the benefit of seek deferment relative to lobby 
against war.  Only when ba < bd  - Pdc , does lobby against war strictly dominate seek 
deferment.  Note that Pdc > bd , effectively eliminates the possibility that lobby strictly dominates 
seek deferment, because such a condition would require ba to take on a negative value, which is 
not permitted.  Thus, the presence of a private alternative seriously diminishes the likelihood of 
producing the public good. 
 
(Player i, All Others) Do Nothing Lobby Against War Seek Deferment
Player i  is Drafted War is avoided Player i  is Drafted
( -c , -c) ( 0 , -ba ) ( -c , -bd - c + Pdc )
Player i  is Drafted War is avoided Player i  is Drafted
( -ba - c , -c ) ( -ba , -ba ) ( -ba - c , -bd - c + Pdc )
Player i  may be Drafted War is avoided Player i  may be Drafted







We know that in reality, people, on occasion, are able to solve collective action problems.  
Mancur Olson (1971) notes that political interest groups do form, but such groups tend to be 
small and have homogeneous interests.  Thus, trade groups, due to their relatively small size and 
their common interest in the promotion of their industry, often successfully form lobbying 
groups.   
 
In contrast, large diffuse groups tend to do poorly in this regard.  In order for a large group to 
succeed, its leaders must offer selective private incentives to eliminate the free-rider problem.  
Thus, large heterogeneous groups such as the AARP also offer insurance services and 
publications, etc.  Suppose that instead of the top 1,000 households, our scenario more 
realistically involved the households in, say, the top 1% of the income distribution, totaling 1 
million households.  Even if the K required to avoid the war were as low as 300,000 households, 
it would still involve the cooperation of an extraordinary large number of people.  These 
individuals would have little in common, except their affluence and their positions atop the 
income distribution.  The fact that few, if any, lobbying groups exist today that seek to promote 
the interests of the top 1% of income earners indicates of the challenge this group faces to 
overcome the collective action problem.     
 
In addition, heterogeneous groups tend to require differential contribution among its members, a 
phenomenon that Olson refers to as the “exploitation of the great by the small” (1971: 29).  Even 
at the top of the income distribution, there are considerable differences in income.  This means 
that wealthier group members tend to subsidize less-wealthy members.  In our case, as we relax 




valuation of c, ba, and bd, we would expect those at the very top of the income distribution to 
have to contribute a higher ba in order to participate in the production of the public good.  This 
phenomenon would further erode the group’s ability to solve the collective action problem by 
making seek deferment relatively more enticing. 
 
Some might object that a model that allows the players to pursue only one course of action at any 
one time is unrealistic.  After all, it is entirely conceivable that a household could lobby against 
the war and seek deferment simultaneously.  Suppose a household contributes ba’ and bd’ 
towards lobbying and seek deferment under such a circumstance.  Given the scarcity of a 
household’s resources, it is highly unlikely that ba’ would exceed the ba contributed if lobby 
were pursued singly.  Likewise, bd would likely exceed bd’.  In other words, some of the limited 
resources that could have gone to lobby (seek deferment) if pursued with singular focus would 
instead be diverted to seek deferment (lobby).12,13 Thus, the possibility for a household to 
simultaneously lobby against the war and seek deferment does little to improve the chances of 
solving the collective action problem. 
 
Finally, the current construct does not even allow for the possibility that, while these families 
may desperately wish to avoid the possibility that their son is drafted and sent to war, some 
families may expect substantial private benefits to going to war.  War can be a tremendously 
profitable business and many of those whose livelihoods are connected with the Military 
Industrial Complex are certainly among the top income earning households.  A family faced with 
private benefits from going to war would face a substantially lower payoff for lobby against war 
                                                            
12 Note: A Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium does not exist because do nothing strictly dominates all strategies. 





and a substantially larger payoff to seek deferment.  Thus, the inclusion of the real possibility of 
private benefits of going to war redounding to some of the players undermines the group’s ability 
to produce the public good. 
 
Our intent with this simple model is to highlight the unique collective action problem the elite 
face when their sons are threatened with conscription.  Most public goods problems either are 
solved collectively or remain unsolved.  For example, suppose a town is in imminent danger of 
flooding from a nearby river.  The townspeople could build an emergency dike to save the town 
but doing so would require a large proportion of the population to participate.  While most 
individuals would find that building the dike would personally provide them with substantial 
private benefits, like saving their house and possessions, they would still have an incentive to 
free ride, for two reasons.  First, the benefits of such an endeavor could not be limited to only 
those who helped in the construction.  Second, their private resources committed to building the 
dike, if they don’t reach a critical threshold, are wasted.  Thus, unless the townspeople are able to 
overcome this private incentive to free ride (using social mechanisms like reputation or shame, 
perhaps) the dike will not be built and the town will suffer catastrophic flooding. 
 
The collective action problem that the politically powerful face in this instance is different 
because they have an extra private option.  In addition to the options to cooperate or defect, they 
can exercise a distinctly private option, namely seeking a deferment.  This private option 
provides a direct tangible benefit (in an expected value sense), namely, the individual’s son 




prospects of solving the problem collectively.  It is as if each family in the flooding example 
were sufficiently wealthy to build its own dike around its property. 
 
C.  Evidence, Anecdotal and Otherwise, on Avoiding Service 
 
Some of those who argue that putting sons of the politically influential at risk of being drafted 
would substantially increase opposition to war point to the Vietnam war as their Exhibit A.  
Their argument is that as the risk of being killed or wounded in Vietnam increased, the domestic 
opposition to the Vietnam War increased.  On its face, this is plausible. 
 
Yet a look below the surface undercuts the claim.  The Urban Research Corporation in Chicago 
published a study in 1970 titled Student Protests 1969.  The authors had monitored and analyzed 
the 292 major campus protests that had occurred between January and June 1969.  This was at 
the height of the anti-Vietnam war agitation.  Of those 292 protests, they found, exactly one was 
about the draft and in only six protests was the Vietnam War the major issue.  The major issue in 
143 of the protests was “black recognition.” 
 
It is true, however, that this six-month period is only a slice of a longer time period.  Anyone 
who was a sentient American adult at the time can recall that there were many anti-Vietnam war 
protests.  Two facts, though, are striking.  First, the existence of a draft did not prevent the 
Vietnam war or even appear to affect how intense the war became.  Second, it took many years 




wounded before the war ended.  Indeed, it took a few years of high casualties before there were 
widespread protests against the Vietnam war.   
  
There is ample evidence, though, that many men who were at risk of being drafted took many 
measures to avoid the draft or to get a relatively safe job within the military.  And of these men 
who did so, a disproportionately high number were from families in middle and upper income 
classes.  Baskir and Strauss (1978) present much of the evidence on this.  One of their pieces of 
evidence is a survey they did, admittedly non-random, of 1,586 men, divided into roughly equal-
size groups of men from South Bend, Indiana; Ann Arbor, Michigan; and Washington, D.C.  
They found that “men from disadvantaged [i.e., low-income] backgrounds were about twice as 
likely as their better-off peers to serve in the military, go to Vietnam, and see combat (pg 9).” 
 
Baskir and Strauss also report anecdotal evidence from observers at the time.  It should be noted 
that these anecdotes are not about one or two people, but about hundreds.  They write: 
Congressman Alvin O’Konski took a personal survey of one hundred inductees 
from his northern Wisconsin district.  Not one of them came from a family with 
an annual income of over $5,000.  A Harvard Crimson editor [James Fallows] 
from the class of 1970 tallied his twelve hundred classmates and counted only 
fifty-six who entered the military, just two of whom went to Vietnam14.   
 
Journalist James Fallows’ (1975) article entitled “What did you do during the class war, daddy?” 
outlines how he and his fellow Harvard classmates enjoyed a considerable advantage relative to 
young men from working class families from nearby Chelsea, MA, in avoiding the draft. 
 
                                                            




Barnett et al (1992), challenging Fallows, analyze deaths from the Vietnam War to test the 
hypothesis that poor and working class members of society were over-represented among combat 
casualties.  They find little to no difference between casualty rates among various classes.  The 
authors first take a random sample of those killed in action.  Data on the individuals’ families do 
not exist, so the researchers approximate family income as a surrogate for class by matching the 
service member’s home of record to the median income for that locality according to census data 
for that time.   
 
The study contributes only tangentially to the current research question as its authors were 
unable to make any determination regarding the relationship between draft status and death in 
combat.  However, if a significant fraction of those killed in combat were from affluent families, 
that would undercut our contention that the affluent are better able to avoid dangerous service in 
a conscripted military.  While the authors of this study compensate as much as possible for the 
lack of data, ultimately it falls victim to a limitation that Fallows (1993) points out in his 
rejoinder, “[A] study purporting to test whether casualties were representative rests on data that 
defines each casualty as representative.”  In other words, the Barnett et al study, by assuming 
that people from a census locale had the median income of that locale, simply assumed their 
result.  What if the people killed in combat tended to be from the poorer parts of each locale?  As 
Fallows pointed out, Barnett et al’s methodology would completely miss that fact.  
 
Whatever the truth about the relative war deaths of various income groups, the fact is that in a 
system with bureaucratic discretion, those who know how to manipulate bureaucrats are at a 




implausible, our argument does not rest on income.  It rests, instead, on the idea that there is a 
private payoff from spending time, money, and creativity on draft avoidance or, if the person is 
drafted, on getting a safer job within the military.  A man who wants to avoid the draft or get a 
safe job is likely, therefore, to put many more of his and his family’s resources into personal 
avoidance than into political agitation.  This is not to say that the man and his family will engage 




D.  Fiscal Burdens and the Marginal Cost of Going to War 
 
Consider a nation that is not currently at war.  The difference between its military spending when 
it is engaged in war and its spending during peacetime is the marginal cost of fighting the war.  If 
a government that employs an all-volunteer military embarks on a war, it must pay wages that 
are high enough to attract or retain the requisite number of volunteers.  Thus, the marginal cost 
includes both personnel costs and added material costs such as weapons, munitions, fuel, etc.  
Imagine the same government with an equally effective military force, but one that is manned 
with conscripts.  The marginal cost of going to war includes non-personnel costs and only 
minimal personnel costs, if any.  Under conscription, the government does not face market 
pressure to increase compensation to soldiers, even if it intends to send those soldiers to engage 
in dangerous combat.  The conscripted military will still require approximately the same amount 
of weapons and material, and, thus, the primary difference in the magnitude of the marginal cost 
of bringing volunteers to war, compared to bringing an equally capable force of conscripts to 





It has been shown (Syllogistics, 1986) that an all-volunteer force can actually have a lower 
budget cost than a partially conscripted force of equal effectiveness.  The reason, in short, is that 
the equally effective conscripted force will have higher turnover and lower productivity per first-
termer and, therefore, will require more military personnel.  We are not denying that possibility.  
But the relevant comparison is not between the cost of a partially conscripted force and the cost 
of an all-volunteer force.  The relevant comparison is between the increase in budget cost with a 
partially conscripted force and the increase in budget cost with an all-volunteer force when the 
country goes to war. 
  
For a given war, we can compare the marginal costs of fighting the war with a voluntary military 
personnel system and one manned through conscription.  We call the amount by which the 
marginal cost of war for the all-volunteer military exceeds the marginal cost of war for the 
conscripted military the Marginal Personnel Cost. 
 
Given that Americans’ support for wars tend to erode as the duration of the conflict increases and 
as casualties increase, we deduce some characteristics of the Marginal Personnel Cost (MPC).  
First, MPC is directly related to duration of the conflict.  Over time, the wages necessary to 
continue to elicit volunteers to enlist will increase, thus increasing the cost of fielding an all-
volunteer force relative to a drafted one.   
 
Second, MPC is directly related to the scope of the conflict.  In general, an individual sent to a 
combat zone will require additional compensation15.  Similarly, new recruits will tend to require 
greater compensation the greater the chance they will be sent to combat.  The more service 
                                                            




members placed in harm’s way, the greater are the aggregate costs of additional compensation.  
For the same reasons, MPC is also directly related to the rate at which the force suffers 
casualties. 
 
In addition, MPC increases as the proportion of the force that would be drafted in the comparable 
selective service regime increases.  For example, suppose the selective service regime drafts 
some proportion d of total military end-strength.  For d close to zero, MPC is very small, due to 
the fact that with so few draftees, the military personnel system would face essentially the same 
market pressure as an all-volunteer force faces.   However, as d increases, the MPC grows 
monotonically until reaching its maximum at d = 1.0.  [Recall that MPC is the amount by which 
the marginal cost of bringing the AVF to war exceeds the marginal cost of bringing a conscripted 
force to war.]   
 
As discussed above, the primary brake that conscription provides against foreign adventurism 
occurs when the desire of prospective draftees (and those who care about them) to avoid 
dangerous combat translates into lobbying the political establishment to avoid war.  The 
analogue for an all-volunteer force is that the high budgetary cost of war would cause people, 
primarily taxpayers, to lobby the political establishment to avoid war. To the extent the war is 











Under both regimes—draft (partial or complete) and an all-volunteer force—people will be 
inspired to agitate against the war.  The important question is which regime will lead to more 
agitation.   
  
Under an all-volunteer regime, people who wish to reduce their tax burden will, ceteris paribus, 
oppose the war, while under the draft regime, people who wish to avoid being drafted into risky 
military jobs will agitate to oppose the war.  A priori, it is difficult to know which force is 
stronger.  This is the issue that Warren (2011) deals with, but he considers a draft/tax regime that 
is greatly at odds with the regimes that have existed historically.  Specifically, he considers 
lump-sum taxes that are the same amount on everyone and he considers a draft that gives no 
bureaucratic discretion to the draft authorities16.   
 
But even though the a priori comparison is difficult on its face, we can think through the various 
incentives and reach a reasonable conclusion.  Under conscription, those potential conscripts 
who oppose the war will favor acting on their individual incentives and will seek deferments or 
safer jobs in the military.  However, there will be a subset of people for whom deferment is 
infeasible due to their political impotence.  All they will be able to do, therefore, is agitate 
against the war.  However, their agitation is unlikely to be very effective in bringing about 
change because, after all, they are too politically impotent to obtain a deferment.   
 
Moreover, the number of people willing to agitate to avoid war under the all-volunteer regime is 
likely larger than the number under conscription.  The number of taxpayers greatly exceeds the 
                                                            
16 It is true that the shift to a draft lottery in 1970 came close to the kind of non-discretionary draft regime that 




number of people at risk of being conscripted.  Of course, because taxpayers are so numerous, 
the collective good problem rears its ugly head here too:  these taxpayers may oppose the war 
but, given the magnitudes, are unlikely to try very hard. 
 
That is not all that can be said on the topic, however.  We also must consider the role and effect 
of politically powerful people.  
 
The argument in favor of conscription laid out in the introduction is that because politically 
powerful people would face a greater chance of having their “children” sent off to war, they 
would be more likely to agitate to avoid war.  This is in contrast to their behavior under an all-
volunteer force wherein, since they do not bear the burden of sacrifice personally, they are 
willing to allow other parents to let their children be sent off to war.  However, to the extent that 
the politically powerful include those who pay substantial taxes, they tend to bear a substantial 
burden in financing the war.  Sending an all-volunteer force off to war is unambiguously more 
expensive, from the viewpoint of taxpayers, than sending an equally effective conscripted force.   
This effect is larger as the scope of the war and, therefore, the size of the force, increases, the 
duration of the conflict increases, and the proportion of the force that would otherwise be drafted 
increases.   
 
We demonstrated in the previous section that rational people would respond to private incentives 
and tend to seek draft deferments rather than agitating to avoid war through the political system.  
This effect is likely to be particularly significant for politically powerful people, for whom 




family’s resources are scarce, the tendency to seek deferment will blunt the willingness to agitate 
to avoid the war of the class of society that has the best chance of succeeding in agitation.   
 
Consider the effect on the affluent and the politically powerful of tax increases intended to pay 
for the all-volunteer force.  The affluent pay a much higher percent of their incomes in taxes than 
the non-affluent pay17.  Thus, as the affluent see their tax bills rise, their appropriate response 
would be to engage in political agitation to avoid the war.  As of 2007, Henderson estimates that 
the war in Iraq cost the highest income earners—the top 5 percent—an average of approximately 
$6,500 per year18.  Because of the collective good problem, this incentive will be weak.  But the 
more-important point is that it will not be clearly weaker than the incentive of the politically 
powerful to agitate when there is a draft.  The reason, again, is that the politically powerful have 
another avenue to influence what they care most about—their own sons—and that avenue is to 
work individually to get their sons out of the draft or into the safer jobs in the military.  Thus, it 
is plausible that among the politically powerful, an all-volunteer regime more effectively limits 
support for war than does a regime of conscription. 
 
V.  The Historical Narrative: A Comparison 
 
We argue that an all-volunteer military force provides a more effective barrier against foreign 
adventurism than a conscripted force, due in part to the greater MPC required to send an all-
volunteer force off to war (or keep it there) which results in a relatively greater tax burden to 
                                                            
17 In 2009, for example, a fairly typical recent year, the top 1% of taxpayers paid an average income tax rate of 
24.01%, the top 10% paid an average rate of 18.05%, the group in the top 10% to 25% paid an average rate of 
8.23%, and the bottom 50% paid an average rate of 1.85%.  See Logan (2011). 




citizens.  The MPC is directly related to duration of the conflict, the number of military members 
involved, and the proportion of the force that would be drafted in the comparable selective 
service regime.   
 
The evidence of the last fifty years supports the view that a war carried out entirely with 
volunteers has much higher personnel costs than a war carried out with a substantial proportion 
of draftees.  
 
For the greater part of the past decade, the United States military has maintained a force of over 
200,000 service members deployed in support of Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom.   
 
Because volunteers to the force know that they have a substantial probability of serving in the 
war theatre, the military must adjust not only special pays and allowances, but also base pay and 
enlistment and re-enlistment incentive programs, to get the “right” number of volunteers19.   
 
The military compensation part of this base budget has risen as the wars have lengthened. 
Military pay raises are, by law, indexed to the Employment Cost Index (ECI), a formula that 
governs the compensation increases for a large portion of government workers.  In every year 
between 2004 and 2010 (with the exception of 2007) Congress approved pay raises that 
exceeded the ECI by at least 0.5 percentage points (Belasco 2011). 
 
                                                            
19 It is true that at the start of virtually every war the United States, the number of volunteers has increased as 
people, especially young people, seek adventure and danger in pursuit of what most perceive as a just cause.  





Compare military compensation over the last decade of war fought with an all-volunteer force 
with compensation during the other longest war since World War II:  the Vietnam War.   Figure 
4 shows end-strength and military compensation per military member in FY2010 dollars.  The 
first shaded area shows the Vietnam War period, the next shaded area shows the First Gulf War, 
while the third shaded area shows the Afghan and Iraq War period. 
 
 
Figure 4.  MilPers Outlays per Service Member 1950-20102021. 
 
From 1996 to 2001, the average MilPers Outlay per Member was $73,88722.  Since 2004, the 
average has been $103,772, a 40% increase. The difference of $29,000 per service member costs 
                                                            
20 Source: , National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2012 
21 Note: Prior to 1985, Deferred Retirement Pay appeared as a separate budget sub-category.  Since FY1985, 











































































































approximately $45 Billion every year.  So, from this perspective, taking the All-Volunteer Force 
to war (in similar low intensity conflicts) costs an extra $45 Billion each year relative to 
peacetime operations. 
 
Contrast this with the Vietnam experience.  In the ten years prior to the Gulf of Tonkin incident 
in 1964, Milpers Outlays per Member averaged $60,320.  In each of the seven years after the 
incident the United States had greater than 100,000 troops in Vietnam.  During this time MilPers 
Outlays per Member averaged $61,162.  While the outlays per member barely changed, the 
number of service members was on average 500,000 higher during this time, accounting for 
approximately $30 billion in increased personnel costs for each year.   In the Vietnam era, the 
United States sent more than double the number of military members to a combat zone and 
suffered over 10 times the number of deaths relative to the Operations Iraqi and Enduring 
Freedom, yet the annual increase in spending required to prosecute this war was still only two 
thirds of that required to send the All-Volunteer Force to fight in conflicts of substantially lower 
scope and intensity23.   
 
In addition to higher monetary compensation, volunteers also tend to demand other forms of 
compensation, such as safer and better equipment.  According to Candreva (2011), the United 
States spends approximately $202 Million per life lost in the current conflicts, and $267 Million 
during the First Gulf War, which vastly exceed corresponding amounts for the Vietnam and 
Korean wars, $12.7 Million and $9.3 Million (FY$2011).   
                                                                                                                                                                                               
22 MilPers is a DoD budget category that describes monetary compensation for military members, to include base 
pay, special pay, allowances, and retirement contributions.  It does not contain enlistment or re-enlistment bonuses, 
nor does it contain compensation in the form of health care. 





Notice that military pay per member actually fell during the most intense part of the Vietnam 
War.  This was likely due to the fact that inflation increased and nominal pay for first-termers 
was relatively constant: why pay more when you don’t have persuade people to join but can draft 
them instead?  It is true that pay rose substantially from 1969 on, but this is most likely due to 
two factors: (1) the rapidly dropping end-strength as the war wound down, which meant fewer 
first-termers and a higher proportion of relatively senior and, therefore, relatively well-paid 
personnel and (2) the large pay increases in 1971 to prepare to transition to the all-volunteer 
force24.   
   
One might think that a reason for the increased spending on behalf of military personnel in the 
past decade is that Americans people wanted to show their gratitude to the soldiers, sailors, 
airmen, and Marines risking their lives to prosecute the nation’s wars.  During the Vietnam era, 
anti-war protesters often ostracized military members and veterans for their participation in the 
war.  In stark contrast, the current climate of debate is one in which criticism of the military and 
its members is almost non-existent.  In fact, few public institutions enjoy as must trust and 
support as does the military (see Jones, 2011). According to this line of reasoning, this same 
feeling of extreme gratitude would likely extend to a drafted military as well, thereby 
undercutting our claim that the All-Volunteer Force is more fiscally burdensome. 
 
But is this claim backed up empirically?  It is not.  Consider the history of accessions for the past 
ten years. The Department of Defense has missed its recruiting mission only three times since 
                                                            




1980.  One of those years was 2005, when actual recruits numbered over 6,000 fewer than 
required -- a 4% deficit.   
 
Recruiting challenges extended beyond aggregate numbers.  As Figure 6 illustrates, while High 
Quality recruits (purple line with triangle markers) increased as a percentage of total mission 
during the early part of the decade, it reached a peak of 67% during FY2004 and then dropped 
dramatically in each of the next four years to a minimum of 59%.   
 
Figure 6.  Defense Department Recruit Quality 2000-2009.25 
 
If the military were simply lavishing rents onto service members in the form of above-market 
wages on behalf of a grateful public, it is highly unlikely that the Department of Defense would 
                                                            
25 High School Diploma Grads (HSDG); AFQT Categories:  Cat I-IIIA (50-99); Cat IIIB (31-49); Cat IV (10-30).  
“High Quality” are those recruits with High School Diplomas and Cat I-IIIA.  Source: “Recruit Quality Over Time.” 
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have had any problems eliciting high-quality volunteers.  A 2009 study commissioned by the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness declares that “[T]he effects of war on 
recruiting are real.  After combat operations commenced in Iraq and Afghanistan, the services 
struggled to meet enlistment goals and maintain the quality of the force, with recruiting 
challenges becoming more severe as troop deployments and casualties rose (Bicksler and Nolan 
2009, pg 17).”  The same study also notes that the proportion of the Army’s recruits who were 
high quality “dropped from approximately 60 earlier in the decade down to 44 percent in 2008 
(pg 37)” and blames the war for the “sizeable negative effect on high-quality Army enlistments 
(pg 16).”26  Of course in later years the military had less trouble hitting its recruiting goals, but 
this was during one of the deepest recessions and slowest recoveries of the post-World War II 
era. 
 
There is no doubt that other factors, namely the growing economy, contributed to the recruiting 
challenges in the middle of the previous decade.  However, the data are also quite consistent with 
the idea that market pressures ensure that the All-Volunteer Force is more fiscally costly than a 
conscripted one. 
 
The All-Volunteer Force contains a natural arresting mechanism on the size and scope of 
military involvement due at least in part to the fact that providing financial incentives to acquire 
sufficient volunteers can result in substantial pressure on the government’s budget.  Due to the 
costs of recruiting, training, and retaining qualified military members, the government will tend 
                                                            
26 See Christensen (2011) for an analysis of the effect of war deaths on local recruiting efforts.  He finds a modest 
(approximately 1%) deterrent effect on recruiting applicants in the month following a war death in the county.  This 
effect is larger for higher-quality recruits, and larger in less-populated counties.  The effect is smaller or even 




to find it beneficial to expand the use of civilian contractors to provide both combat and non-
combat services.  Data from the previous decade are consistent with this narrative.   
 
Between 2007 and 2009, contractors very nearly outnumbered deployed uniformed service-
members in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  During that same time, Private Security Contractors 
accounted for approximately 20% of all deployed contractors.  In addition, contractors are killed 
and wounded at higher rates than are military personnel (Schwarz and Swain, 2011).   
 
VI.  Implications for policy 
 
 
The implication of this research for policy is clear.  There is little reason to believe that initiating 
a draft would reduce popular support for war enough to cause Congress either to refuse to grant 
authorization for proposed small wars or to revoke the authority to use military force in existing 
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